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ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN
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Alan Oxley**
OVERVIEW
At the Bogor Summit in 1994,the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) leaders committed to reduce all barriers to trade by 2010 for
industrializedcountriesand2020for developingcountries.As policymakers
grapple with these programs, it is becoming increasingly clear that the
liberalization processhas been rushed and that the proper groundwork is
yet to be laid for an effective processof trade liberalization.
Collective trade liberalization is a very complex endeavor. No multilat-
eral or plurilateralprocesshaseverbeenachievedquickly.Itwas unrealistic
of APEC leaders to direct preparation of ;detailedplansfor liberalization in
i2 months, asthey did at Osaka.
There is a need to develop a broader consensus about the strategic
purpose of trade liberalization among APEC economies. There is also a
need for substantial discussion and research about the modalities for
successful liberalization in ,_PEC.
The concept of "Open Regionalism" has encouraged advocacy of
collective unilateral liberalization.This approach lacksthe rigor and institu-
tional strength which is needed for an effective process of liberalization.
*Thispaperisbasedon apresentationmade tothe APECStudyCentresNetworkConference
in Manilain May 1996.
**The authoris Chairmanof the AustralianAPEC StudyCentre, He is a formerAustralian
AmbassadortotheGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade (GA'I-r) and aformerChairman
of theGAFF Contracting Parties.180 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
Until there isa wider consensus over the strategic issueswhich liberaliza-
tion creates and more ground has been prepared on designing workable
mechanisms to cut trade barriers, the results of liberalization from APEC
will beslight, More time is needed. It is available.
INTRODUCTION
At the 1994Bogor Summit in Indonesia,the APEC leaders committed
to reduce all barriers totrade by 2010for industrializedcountries and 2020
for developing countries. A year later at Osaka, Japan, APEC leaders
decided that by the Subic Summit in November 1996 in the Philippines,
programsto achieve the Bogortargets would becompleted. As policymak-
ers grapple with these programs,it is becoming increasingly clear that the
liberalization process has been rushed and that the proper groundwork
needsto be laid for an effective process of trade liberalization.
For collective trade liberalization to be successful, several critical
elements are necessary.First, there hasto bea high-level political commit-
ment to liberalize. Second, the strategic interests in economic integration
of all participating economies have to be understood and provided for.
Finally, a mechanism has to be established to ensure that the process is
comprehensive and binding.All sectorsof commercemust beincluded and
all parties must be formally bound to the process, The process must also
produce a net economic benefitfor members of the group as well as their
trading partners.
This third element is the hardest to create. Governmentsneed help to
cut trade barriers. The reason they chose to do it collectively is that the
existence of an international mechanism and obligation assists them to
overcome domestic resistance to change. It is common in all large proc-
essesofcollective trade liberalizationto spendas much timeon settlingthe
modalities as onthe actual process of negotiating the reductions.
To date, only one of these elements has been created. The Bogor
Declaration provided the high-level political commitment. There has been
little discussion of the strategic interests involved,,but the issues are large.OXLEY: TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN APEC 181
For example, what is needed.tosecure the United States' (U.S.) commit-
ment to such a process? How can China's half-market economy be inte-
gratedwith market economies? Thedebate does not haveto beconducted
publicly in APEC fora. Butit needs to bethe subject of constant review and
discussion among opinionmakers, academics and policymakers.
Discussion of the modalitieshas only just begun. It is not possible for
16countries, includingthree of the world's biggesteconomies, to settle the
modalities fora processof liberalizationin the scale envisaged inthe Bogor
Declarationinjust twoyears. Ittook nearlyfouryearstosettle the modalities
of the Uruguay Round, and they already had basic rules for negotiating
reductions in place. The political leaders did themselves and APEC a
disservice by decreeing, as they did at their summitsat Bogor and Osaka,
that the modalitieswould besettled in two years.
The dominant concept for shaping the modalities to date is what has
generally been termed "Open Regionalism." This concept is broad and
attempts to articulatethe desireof theAPEC member-economiesto pursue
regional economic integration without creating a closed economic region.
The conceptwas not rigorous, in keepingwith the requirement in the.early
stages ofAPEC's development,to focus on buildingconsensus byempha-
sizing what is common and disregarding what is not.
The Open Regionalism advocates promoted another consensus-
friendly approach when it came tothe question of howto cuttrade barriers.
This was the concept of cutting trade barriers by a collective process of
unilateral reductions. This modality appealed to APEC officials who had
been directed by the Osaka Summit to come up with an agreed approach
within 12months. Itsutility was that itwas anapproachwith which all APEC
governments could agree.
Buttherein lies its weakness. Fundamentaldifferenceson some issues
remain unaddressed. Isagriculture in? Isinvestment in?Is there acommon
timetable for reductions? Who will beclassified as a developing economy
in 2010?
There will be no substantial processof liberalization achieved until all
the key elements which are the necessary preconditions of any processof182 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
collective trade liberalization are in place. The negotiations inthe Uruguay
Roundand other recentregionalprocessesofliberalizationprovide awealth
of experience from which to draw_Manylessons about how processes can
assist governments to support and implementtrade liberalization are there
to be drawn.
Government officials are well aware that these issues need to be
addressed. They have been constrained to respond to the timetables
imposed by leaders. Deliberation takes time, and such was not given.
Academics have not been so constrained, but discussion about how
liberalization should occur has nevertheless been limited. Apart from brief
advocacyof the idea ofa regionalFreeTradeAgreement bysome academ-
ics in the US, the idea of "Open Regionalism" and the related concept of
unilateral reductions virtually enjoys the status of an orthodoxy among
academics in the region. Many significant issues remain unaddressed.
STRATEGIC ISSUES
Tradeliberalizationcreateseconomic integration.Integratingoneecon-
omy with another isa highlypoliticalact.Governmentscannotdothis unless
they are satisfied that very basic strategic interests are being advanced or
protected. APEC includes three of the largest economies in the world, as
well as all of the fastest growing economies. Integrating the APEC mem-
ber-economies entails integration ofthe economiesof countrieswith highly
disparate cultures. Previously, all regional processesof economic integra-
tion involvedeconomiesthat were contiguous or had a high levelof political
and economic homogeneity.
Achieving economic integrationamong the APEC member-economies
is a major task. There are a number of major strategic issues that needto
be tackled if significant liberalization among APEC members is to be
realized. Some key issues are:
• Will the U.S. useAPEC as an instrument for economic in'cegration?
• Is Japan preparedto open protected and heavily regulated sectors?
• Can China resume market reform in a systematic way?OXLEY: TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN APEC 183
° AreASEAN member-economiespreparedto openstrategic national
industries to competition?
• Will Asian economies openthe services sectorsto competition?
= Will Asian economies remove barriers to investment?
Until governments accept that trade,liberalization will bite into some
very sensitive and difficultissues,generalcommitmentsto liberalizeremain
in the realm of political rhetoric. Substantial public discussion of all these
issues is a necessary precondition to realize the Bogor Declaration.
THE CHALLENGE OF LIBERALIZATION
AMONG APEC MEMBER-ECONOMIES
The need for further trade liberalizationamong APEC member-econo-
mies is evident. Even after the Uruguay Round results are taken into
account, averagelevels of protection remain higher amongthe developing
economies of APEC than among Organization of Economic Co-operation
for Development (OECD) member-countries in general. Even then, the
incidence of protection isstillsignificant among industrializedeconomies in
the region.
Recent analyses oftrade barriers whichthe Pacific Economic Co-op-
eration Council (PECC) hasproducedfor APEC providea useful pictureof
what has been achievedand what needs to bedone.1They also contain a
cautionary message which academics and policymakers needto address.
They showthat notall economies in the Asian Pacificregion have engaged
in substantial unilateral liberalizatio=,over the last decade. Itwould appear
that trade barriers in Thailand have not fallen. It is.also clear that there is
distinct disinclination across the region not to open markets for services.
Rates of growth among the Asian economies of APEC have been
higher than the global average for more than a decade. To maintain
sustainable and stable growth, the governments of these economies will
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exposure to competitive forces. In most economies in the region,there are
major impediments to fuller development of marketeconomies.
Until the seventies, the strategic mission of trade liberalization in the
postwar period was to reduce tariffs and eliminate nontariff barriers in
industrial products. This program had generally been successful. Tariffs in
industrialized countries were reduced to a global average of around 5
percent. Butthere isstill some moppinguptodo. Trade barriers,both tariffs
and nontariff barriers, are significant in particular sectors. But the overall
aim has been achieved_reater economic growth by the creation of
international markets; The result has been greater integration of global
economic activity.
The strategic mission oftrade liberalizationtoday is removalof barriers
to trade in services. In Europe, the most important achievements of the
European Countries (EC) Single Market Program were to reduce barriers
to services trade among European countries. The North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is most notable for its provisions on services
and investment. The Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (AN-
ZCERTA) between Australia and New Ze'alandalso opened service mar-
kets. The global complement to these regional arrangements was the
inclusion of services in the mandate of the Uruguay Round and the
consequent negotiation of the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS).
While marketsfor services industriesare beingsteadilyopened inNorth
America and Europe, there is resistance to similar liberalization in Asia.
Asian economies have been slow to accept the importance of the liberali-
zation of the services sectors. The ASEAN member-economies played an
influential blocking gamein the negotiation ofcommitments to liberalization
•in the servicesnegotiations inthe UruguayRound.Japanwas alsoreluctant
to open markets for financial services. Reportedly,ASEAN leaders have
now accepted that the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) should be
extendedto cover services. Itremains tobe seenhow thiswill translate into
binding commitments.OXLEY: TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN APEC 185
The foregoing demonstrates the size and complexity of the task of
meeting the Bogortargetsof eliminatingall barrierstotrade and investment.
Governments will need help to achieve it.
MECHANISMS FOR LIBERALIZATION
There are three traditional pathsto liberalization:multilateralliberaliza-
tion through the processes of the GATT and World Trade Organization
(WTO); unilateral liberalization by individual countries; and regional liber-
alization through free trade arrangements. Each contributes in varying
degrees to the need of governments to manage the politics of trade
liberalization.
Multilateral Liberalization
Most liberal economists would accept that the most effective form of
trade liberalizationisthroughthe multilateralprocessesof theW-I-O.Each
barrierreducedthroughthe processesof the GATT opens the marketto
everyotherGA-I-rParty.These reductions are nondiscriminatory andtheir
maximumbenefitextendstoallcountrieswhicharepartyto the GATT.The
WTO processeshave been developedover the years and are now very
sophisticatedas a resultof the UruguayRound_ They embrace a number
ofelementswhichassistgovernments todealwiththepoliticsofopposition
to liberalization.
First, the multilateralnegotiatingprocessentailsan internationalcom-
mitmentwhichisbinding.Itjustifiesa reviewof domesticlevelsof protec-





Second, it enablesgovernmentsto demonstratethateverybodyelse
hastoundergo the painof cuts.There is nodoubtthat, bypointingto the186 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
cutsthatUS farmers faced,the Frenchgovernment was assisted in arguing
the casefor cuts in French farm budgets to its farmers.
Third, the multilateral process allows linkages to be established be-
tween programs of reductions in different sectors. This enables other
interests to be enlisted to support liberalization. The French government
enlisted the supportof French companieswho stood to benefitfrom cuts in
manufacturingand servicestocounterthe politicalweight ofoppositionfrom
farmers. Representatives in the US Congress were able to make similar
arguments to counter the influenceof the US clothing and textile industry.
Finally, a comprehensive program of liberalization which embraces a
large number of countries and a wide range of products can create a
liberalizing dynamic among groups of countries. In the Uruguay Round,
there was a broad deal between industrialized and developing countries
that liberalization on new issues of greater interest to industrialized coun-
tries, such as on services and intellectual property,would be accepted by
developing countries provided there was liberalization by indu_,trialized
countries in sectorsof greater importanceto developing countries, notably
agriculture and textiles.
The plain lesson of the Uruguay F_oundis that, notwithstanding the
economic gains to be made in France, Germany, Switzerland, the US,
Japanand Koreafrom cuttingthe levelof supportfor domesticfarmers, the
mere assertion of that fact would never have been enough to enable
governments in those countries to overcome domestic opposition to cuts.
They could not have agreed to the even modest cuts that were ultimately
madewithout their being buttressed by the obligation of participating in an
international endeavor and the formal commitmentswhich were created by
the Uruguay Round.
Itwas always opentothese governmentsto trytosecurethose benefits
by liberalizing unilaterally. This would have been far quicker than the
inevitably prolonged processof multilateral negotiations,This did not occur
because it was not a political option.The logicof the case of the economic
benefitto bewon by unilateral liberalizationwas not powerful.The interna-
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of influencesand forces to support the political case for.liberalization than
are available in a domestic politicalsystem.
Canwe look to the WTO to advance liberalization in the region?This
would be an idealvehicle. There will bea successorround to the Uruguay
Round, but when? Accordir_g to the Bogor Declaration, all barriers in
industrialized APEC member-economies are to be removed by 2010.
However, we are not likely to see further cuts to barriers from global
liberalization from the WTO processes within 12 years. No date has been
set for the next WTO trade round. The dates set for the end of the reform
periodfor agriculture and the end of the reform period in textilesagreement
in the Uruguay Round--2000 and 2004 respectively---create a time period
during which the start of the next round of WTO negotiations is likely. And
if the next round takes seven years like the last one, we will not see the
beginning of the next round of reductions in trade barriers before 2008 or
2011.If the periods for reducing barriers average seven years, as they do
in the Uruguay Round, the changes from the next round will not be fully
implemented until between 2015 and 2018.
Itshould benotedthat itwould notberealistictoexpect alltrade barriers
to be removed as a result of the next round of WTO trade reductions, in
particularbecause barriersinthe sectorsof agriculture,textilesandservices
are so high. Further reductions are likely, but elimination of all barriers is
not expected. So the Bogor targets are very ambitious. If APEC leaders
wish to instigate a substantive process of liberalization, something more
than working through the WTO processes is required.
Unilateral Liberalization
Ifearly and comprehensive liberalization cannot besecured through a
WTO multilateralprocess,the next best meansisfor eabhcountry toreduce
trade barriers unilaterally. Someneoclassical economists argue that under
any circumstances, un, ilateral liberalization isthe preferredapproach. Itwill
generally create a greater gain in economic welfare in most cases.
What are the prospects for unilateral liberalization as a vehicle for
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member-economies? Thebroadtrend in theeighties ofsteadyliberalization
of tariffs and nontariff barriers is likely to continue among the emerging
economies inthe region. Butthere isevidenceof reluctancetocomprehen-
sively cuttrade barriers. Itisincreasinglycommon amongcountriesto leave
certain sectors more highlyprotected. Usually this isjustified to supportthe
development of a strategic industry.This has beenthe case among indus-
trialized economiesfor severaldecades.The industrialsectorswheretrade
barriers tend to remain high are agriculture, iron and steel, processed
chemicals, automobiles and clothing and textiles.
A principalreasonfor the useofthe GATTsystemfor trade liberalization
is the presumptionthat all sectors of trade are covered.
Thereare plentyof indications of reluctancein Asia to liberalizeacross
the board.ASEAN countries have been hesitantto embrace trade liberali-
zation through AFTA whose objectives are modest. The amount of trade
which they affect is limited. Thescope of the treaty has recentlyexpanded,
butthe effect isuncertain. AFTAis likelyto havea significant discriminatory
effect on trade ina number of industrialproducts.There are also signsthat
the ASEAN countries may reinstitute a discriminatory investment regime.
The AFTA process has been a slow one, notwithstanding the recent
decision to speed up the timetable for implementation.
Itshould beexpectedthen thatthe processesof unilateral liberalization
would onlyyield liberalizationin sectorswhere tradeor domestic production
capacity isnotsignificantorwhere domesticindustryisgloballycompetitive.
Areas where this is not the case would be set aside. The experience with
efforts at unilateral liberalization afterthe Osaka Summit tends to bearthis
out.
Regional Liberalization
A third option isregional liberalization.This isusuallyachieved through
a bilateralor plurilateraltreatywhichsets outtimetablesfor reductionand
establishesformal legal commitmentsto securesuch liberalization.Until
recently,there were not many examplesof successfulfree trade agree-
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The tradeagreementlandscapehasbeen radicallyalteredduring the
eighties. First, the Canada/US free trade agreement was negotiated and
then extended to Mexico in NAFTA.The AFTA and the MERCORSUR
agreement between Brazil,Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay have been
negotiated.Chile isto negotiate a freetrade agreement with the US,while
Argentina isalso interested in an agreement with the US. New Zealand is
exploring an agreement with Chile.These agreements are bound in rules
and therefore can assist governments to manage the politics of trade
liberalization. The extent to which this applies depends on a variety of
factors, in particularthe comprehensivenessofthe scopeofthe agreement
and the numberof participants.Ifthere hasbeensuch a proliferationoffree
trade agreements,why isthere such hostilityto the idea when the issueof
howto secure liberalizationin the Asia-Pacific region is considered?
The conventional answer has been that free trade agreements are
discriminatory.The general contention is that, if all the APEC member-
economies agreedto reduce trade barriers among themselves, this would
distort the patternsof world trade and producea lessthan optimumgain in
net economic welfarefor-the countriesconcerned.While this contention is
generally correct, its validity depends on the circumstances.
TheGATTdecreesthata freetrade areaora customsunioncancoexist
with a multilateral trading system,provided that the net effect is that third
partiesdo notfind their overalltrade diminished once the newarrangement
comes into effect. When Spain and Portuga}joined the EC, the US com-
plainedthat barriersto US agdculturalexportsrose.The EC counteredthat
US trade acrossthe boardwould remainatthe same level becausebarriers
onother productswould come down, compensatingfor the loss of markets
for agricultural products.
A set of trading arrangements which discriminate against trade with
third partiescompared to trade between members of the agreement does
not causea net lossof economic welfare if the members to the agreement
also phasedown trade barriers with the thirdparties. Thiswas the casewith
Australia and New Zealand in ANZCERTA. If the AFTA countdes reduce
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as when they cut trade barriers among themselves, there should be no net
adverse effect on economic welfare.
This leads to a very fundamental point. The level of discrimination
matters.A number of economists believe todaythat if the level of discrimi-
nation is small,the net effect oneconomic welfare will not be negative. So
the range of questions which should beasked about discrimination should
be broadened. The question should not only be "is it discriminatory?" it
should also be "how discriminatory will it be?" and "what will be the net
effect on economic welfare?"
REVISITING "OPEN REGIONALISM"
Toavoid the possibilityof adiscriminatory agreement appears to have
been instrumental in the development of the concept of "Open Regional-
ism," Advocacy ofthe concepthasnot beenmatchedby practicalproposals
on howto make it work. Efforts to apply the conceptare usually reducedto
a statement of the criteria which should be satisfied when liberalization
takes place, and invariably to only one criterion--liberalization should be
nondiscriminatory. There are only two ways this can be achieved--by
liberalizing through the VVTO, or by liberalizingunilaterally.
Trade reductions negotiated through GATT processes apply to all
trading partners, not just to APEC member-economies. Realization of the
Bogor Declaration in this way might amount to a strategy whereby APEC
members would take a common approach and act as a caucus to push for
it in the next round of WTO trade negotiations. As observed above, this
would seem to lead to a more modest resultthanthat implied in the vision
and bold sentiments of the Bogor Declaration.
The other presumption of the "Open Regionalism" advocates is that
governmentswould act in a unilateraland voluntaryway toreduce barriers,
but in concert. This is a process which might conveniently be called
"concurrent unilateral voluntary trade liberalization" (cuvtl).
The major shortcoming of thisapproach isthat it does not help govern-
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are aware that there is no formal obligation to liberalize, they will press
governments to omit sensitive sectors, asJapanesefarmers did beforethe
Osaka leaders meeting.
This phenomenon is already evident in the efforts of APEC members
to create unilateral programs to reduce trade barriers in the leadupto the
Subic Leaders Summit. At the previous summit at Osaka, they committed
to develop "Individual Action Plans" (lAPs) in which they would set out
national programsofunilateral reductionstoachieve the goals ofthe Bogor
Declaration. The results were very modest. And in almost all cases,
commitments did not go beyond standing commitments, usually those
made in the Uruguay Round, and most sensitive areaswere avoided. This
is no surprise. There are no cases where it can be demonstrated that a
"cuvtl" process has beeneffective.
The historyof trade liberalizationindicatesthat successful international
effortsto reducetrade barriers involveinternationalcommitmentswhichare
legally binding, and require trading partners to accept similar obligations
and establish a formal obligation to be part of a broad international deal.
These are also features of regional agreements, such as ANZCERTA,
NAFTA and AFTA.
Can the concept of some form of regional agreement which involves
more binding commitments be applied to the liberalization processes
amongAPEC member-economies?Todate,the concepthasbeensetaside
because it has been regardedas failing the requirement to produce liber-
alization which is nondiscriminatory.The issue of discrimination should be
looked at empirically. What sortof problemdoes it create?
Inthe traded-goods sector,the major problemwould betrade between
the emerging economies of the region and Europein industrialproducts. It
is likely that a general reduction of tariffs on industrial.goods in an APEC
regional freetrade agreementwould resultindiscriminationagainst imports
from Europe.2Trade barriers between Europeand the industrialized mem-
bersof AP_F.C areroughly the same. InternalAPEC reductionswould lower
barriersinthe emergingAsianeconomies toexports from the industrialized
members of APEC, but not to exports from Europe.192 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
How big a problem would this be? Until some analysis isdone, it is
impossible to say. If the margins were not great, there may not be a net
negative impact on economic welfare. If the marginswere significant, the
negative effect may be significant, and this is not a situation that anyone
would want. The European Union (EU) would not be likely to tolerate it. Its
markets for exports from Asia and its levelsof investment outflow to Asia
are sufficiently largethat it could exertsignificant influenceonthe countries
of the region to pay attention to its interests. The interest of economies in
the APEC region in trade and investmentwith Europeare sufficiently great
that they would not want to follow a course of action which jeopardized it.
Evensuch an outcomedoes not of itselfwarrant ajudgment that some
form offree trade arrangement could not work. There aremechanisms that
can be adopted which would obviate the negative effects of discrimination
againsttrading partners outsideAPEC.A regionalagreement might specify
that all trade reductionsshould bemadeaccordingto a mostfavored nation
(MFN) basis. Certain commitments might be made conditional on their
adoption ina WTO multilateraltrade negotiation.Thepoint isthat aregional
agreement should not ipso facto be ruled out until empirical work is done
to assess the impacts of various models of liberalization.
THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF SERVICES
The servicessector created a different set of problemswhich do not
appear to have been systematically addressed. It is still unclear what sort
of international system for liberalizing trade in serviceswill develop under
GATS. Commitments to liberalizehave been made in many areas, but in
the critical sectorsof financial servicesand telecommunications,the ab-
senceof a commitment byboththe U.S.andthe EU tothe basicprinciples
of MFN is a seriousweakness.The GATS cannotyet be said to be an
instrumentof the marketlike the GAFF,which,at present,arrangesthe
scheduling of individual commitments toprovidemarketaccessibility.
The ultimatedieection of the GATS may notbe settleduntilthe next
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agreementson reciprocalaccessif there isno universaland unqualified
commitmentbyallpartiestoapplycompetitiveprinciplestomarketaccess.
In the interim,regionalmarketsfor servicesare developinginEuropeand
NorthAmerica,fosteredby regionalagreements.
There are many optionsfor APEC member-economiesconsiderto
openservicesmarkets.A regionalagreementcouldbeavehicletoadvance
a levelof marketopeningand commitment to marketprincipleswhichare
notachievableundertheGATS.Commitments undera regionalagreement
tocreateregionalmarkets forservices wouldhaveapositiveimpact.Ifthere
was agreementto fullyapplythe GATStothefinancialservicesand basic
telecommunications sectors,pan-regionalagreementsto liberalizewould
create an incentiveto transfercommitments to buildglobal marketsinto
GATS.
A majorissueherewouldarisewiththe EC. Underthe single-market
program,the EC hasalready undertakena formof discriminatory liberali-
zation in services.Single-marketcommitments applyonlyto members of
the EuropeanEconomicArea. They have guaranteedaccess to each
other'smarkets.Thirdpartieshaveaccesstothosemarketsonareciprocal
basis.The EC willnotdeny accessifit considers that itsserviceproviders
receivenationaltreatmentinforeign•markets.If Asianand Pacificecono-
mieswere to set upa regionalframeworkfor liberalization which implied
•the same principles, itwouldcreatepowerfulincentivestotrade rightsof
access acrosstradeblockstocreate multilateralmarkets.
One thing is clear.Given the lack of interestto date in liberalizing
services,there isno reasonto assumethata "cuvtl" processwouldyield
anythingof benefitinthe servicessector.
DEVELOPING AN EFFECTIVEAPPROACH
TO TRADE LIBERALIZATION .....
Collective liberalizationof trade is a very complicated business. No
multilateral or plurilateral program of trade liberalization has ever been
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speedily negotiated. The largerthe number ofcountries involved, the more
complex is the process, A very long processof prenego_iationis required
to establish the terms of, targets for, and modalities of any process of
negotiatingreductions.
It was unrealistic of the APEC leaders to decide at the Osaka Summit
that detailed plansfor achievingthe reductionsin trade barrierswhichwere
agreed the year beforeat Bogorcould be developedwithin 12 months.
There is also a need to reach a general consensus on the strategic
purposeof trade liberalization in the APEC region. Most preexisting cases
of regional and bilateralliberalization are undertakento achieve more than
just the economic benefitswhich collective action to reduce trade barriers
can create. There is oftena strategic or political benefitto bewon from the
economic integrationthat comes from the reductionof barriers totrade and
investment.
The APEC member-economiesappearto agree onthe idea that there
is strategic benefit in enhancing economic integration. But it is not clear if
they have sufficiently articulated this strategic interest to take concrete
action to start reducing trade barriers in earnest.
•There isalso a needfor substantial discussion and research about the
modalitiesof successful trade liberalizationamong the academics, govern-
ment policymakers and researchers in APEC member-economies. What
would be the economic effects of various scenarios of liberalization? How
long will it be before the next tranche of trade liberalization can be realisti-
cally expected from the WTO processes? By what means can regional
processesof liberalizationarmgovernmentstoenablethemtocontendwith
domesticoppositionto liberalization?Isa regionalfreetrade agreementout
of the question? What is the net economic effect of discriminatory agree-
ments if the levels of discriminationare low? What deyices might be used
in a regional agreement to ensure that the optimal liberalizing benefit is
achieved from regional liberalization?
The proponentsof "Open Regionalism" have profferedone approach.
It has encouraged advocacy and encouragement of collective unilateral
liberalization. However, this approach does not providethe rigor or institu-OXLEY: TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN APEC 195
tional strength neededfor aneffective processof plurilateraltrade liberali-
zation.
Until there is a substantial degree of consensus over the strategic
issues and a greater body of work on the issues on how to liberalize, the
trade liberalization processes of APEC will yield slight results. This takes
time. It is available.